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Abstract. Val Plumwood and Richard Sylvan argued from their joint pa-
per The Semantics of First Degree Entailment (Routley and Routley in
Noûs 6(4):335–359, 1972, https://doi.org/10.2307/2214309) and onward
that the variable sharing property is but a mere consequence of a good
entailment relation, indeed they viewed it as a mere negative test of ade-
quacy of such a relation, the property itself being a rather philosophically
barren concept. Such a relation is rather to be analyzed as a sufficiency
relation free of any form of premise suppression. Suppression of premises,
therefore, gained center stage. Despite this, however, no serious attempt
was ever made at analyzing the concept. This paper shows that their sug-
gestions for how to understand it, either as the Anti-Suppression Principle
or as the Joint Force Principle, turn out to yield properties strictly weaker
than that of variable sharing. A suggestion for how to understand some
of their use of the notion of suppression which clearly is not in line with
these two mentioned principles is given, and their arguments to the ef-
fect that the Anderson and Belnap logics T, E and R are suppressive are
shown to be both technically and philosophically wanting. Suppression-
freedom, it is argued, cannot do the job Plumwood and Sylvan intended
it to do.
Mathematics Subject Classification. Primary 03A05; Secondary 03B47.
Keywords. Entailment, Enthymeme, Relevant logics, Suppression.
1. Analytic Introduction
The plan for the paper is as follows: The minimal logic considered in this
paper, unless otherwise stated, is the logic BB. The consequence relations will
throughout the paper be Hilbertian. The definition of a Hilbert proof, as well
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as how to piece together the relevant logics referred to in this paper, is given
in Sect. 2. Section 3 gives a historical account of the notion of suppression,
rooting it in Anderson and Belnap’s paper on enthymemes, and explains the
work Richard Sylvan—with various collaborators—intended the concept to do.
Section 4 defines the first notion of suppression—extensional suppression—
and shows that that property is in fact properly weaker than that of variable
sharing, in fact, properly weaker than the weak variable sharing property and,
furthermore, contra the claims of Sylvan and Plumwood, too weak to rule out
even all the implicational paradoxes even of the first degree. Section 5 is a
short digression on the Ackermann property in which it is shown that that
property is not entailed by variable sharing, and does not entail the property
of extensional suppression freedom. That property is also dealt with in Sect. 6
which first shows that the proof of the claim made in Routley et al.’s Relevant
Logics and Their Rivals [27] that there are logics stronger than E and R
which are obviously suppressive despite having the variable sharing property,
is incorrect. I give an analysis of a new notion of suppression appealed to by
Routley et al. and show that although it does rule out one principle argued
to be suppressive, namely the E-axiom ((A → A) → B) → B, it also rules
the Reductio axiom (A → ∼A) → ∼A suppressive—an axiom at least Routley
was favorable towards—while not ruling the other E-axioms which differentiate
E from DK—one of Routley’s favorite logics—suppressive. I then go through
the arguments adduced by Routley et al. to the effect that these principles
are suppressive, finding all of them rather wanting before Sect. 7 gives a brief
summary.
2. The Hilbert Consequence Relation and Various Relevant
Logics Defined
Definition 1. A proof of a formula A from a set of formulas Γ in the logic L
is defined to be a finite list A1, . . . , An such that An = A and every Ai≤n is
either a member of Γ, a logical axiom of L, or there is a set Δ ⊆ {Aj | j < i}
such that Δ  Ai is an instance of a rule of L. The existential claim that there
is such a proof is written Γ L A.
Table 1 shows how the most familiar relevant logics are pieced together.
To improve readability, I have followed the standard convention of dropping
parenthesis to the effect that ∼A∧B → C∨D is to be parsed as ((∼A)∧B) →
(C ∨D). This is also the convention adhered to in all quotes to be found in this
paper. In addition, however, Sylvan and his collaborators made use of Church’s
dot notation. I have, however, taken the liberty of rendering all quotes in non-
dot notation. Note, furthermore, that Sylvan used ‘&’ to denote extensional
conjunction, whereas I use ‘∧’. ‘↔’ is rarely used, but when it is it is defined
thus: A ↔ B =df (A → B) ∧ (B → A).
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Ax1 A → A
Ax2 A → A ∨ B and B → A ∨ B
Ax3 A ∧ B → A and A ∧ B → B
Ax4 ∼∼A → A
Ax5 A ∧ (B ∨ C) → (A ∧ B) ∨ (A ∧ C)
Ax6 (A → B) ∧ (A → C) → (A → B ∧ C) strong lattice ∧
Ax7 (A → C) ∧ (B → C) → (A ∨ B → C) strong lattice ∨
Ax8 (A → ∼B) → (B → ∼A) contraposition axiom
Ax9 (A → B) → ((B → C) → (A → C)) suffixing axiom
Ax10 (A → B) → ((C → A) → (C → B)) prefixing axiom
Ax11 A → ((A → B) → B) assertion axiom
Ax12 (A → B) ∧ (B → C) → (A → C) conjunctive syllogism
Ax13 A ∨ ∼A excluded middle
Ax14 (A → ∼A) → ∼A reductio
Ax15 (A → (A → B)) → (A → B) contraction axiom
Ax16 ((A → A) → B) → B E-axiom
Ax17 A ∧ B → (A ∧ B) C =df (C → C) → C
R1 A,B  A ∧ B adjunction
R2 A,A → B  B modus ponens
R3 A → B  (B → C) → (A → C) suffixing rule
R4 A → B  (C → A) → (C → B) prefixing rule
R5 A → ∼B  B → ∼A contraposition rule
R6 A → B,A → C  A → B ∧ C lattice ∧
R7 A → C,B → C  A ∨ B → C lattice ∨
R8 A → (B → C), B  A → C δ
R9 A,∼A ∨ B  B γ, disjunctive syllogism
R10 A  ∼(A → ∼A) counter example rule
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3. Enthymemes: On the Origin of Suppression
Arguments such as
All my shoes have yellow laces
∴ All my shoes have colored laces
are often used when introducing the notion of entailment—what it means for a
sentence to logically follow from a collection of sentences taken as assumptions—
as examples of intuitively valid, but in fact invalid arguments; the explanation
being that although the argument does in fact preserve truth, it does not do so
in virtue of its form. Even simpler than the explanation for why the argument
is and ought to be invalid, however, or so the usual introductory story goes,
is the fix which restores the validity to the argument: by adding as an extra
assumption the true claim that all yellow things are colored things—a seman-
tical postulate which simply reports a fact about use of the predicates ‘yellow’
and ‘colored’—the argument becomes an instance of the old-time syllogism
called Barbara.
This is, in fact, the classical so-called missing premise account of an en-
thymeme—an intuitively valid argument which is invalid because it lacks a
premise which happens to in fact be true and readily available in the con-
text the argument is given in. The latter point is reflected even in the word
enthymeme which comes from Greek and means in mind. Thus, normally, it
would be quite OK to simply drop the premise relying on the conversational
context to supply it.1
Now an argument with two premises and a single conclusion can be rep-




but it can also be represented in conditional form, where the conditional, in
some way or another, represents the relation of entailment. The school of
relevant logic started out in the late 1950s as an alternative to the already
existing modal school of analyzing the relationship between entailment and
the relation expressed by the material conditional. The stricter -claim, going
back to both Hugh MacCall and Clarence Irving Lewis,2 was that the material
conditional is not a good candidate for expressing entailment because of the
1One prominent example of this account of an enthymeme can be found in Book 1, Chapter 4
of Buridan’s Treatise on Consequences [10]. The missing premise account of enthymemes has
been the standard theory of Aristotelian enthymemes. Rapp, however, argues convincingly
in [21] that an enthymeme for Aristotle can, but need not, be valid. It should, however,
be a clear demonstration, given the audience at hand, that the conclusion follows from the
premises. Aristotelian enthymemes pertain to rhetorics and as such have prudential features
such as, relative to the audience at hand, not being too long or too complicated, nor have
premises not accepted by the audience, and so on.
2See for instance [13] and [11]. See [22] for details on how MacColl’s work relate to that of
Lewis’.
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paradoxes of material implication. The three most commonly acknowledged
such paradoxes stems from Russell, who writes that
the assertion that q is true or p false turns out to be strictly equiva-
lent to “p implies q”; [. . . ]. It follows from the above equivalence that
of any two propositions there must be one which implies the other,
that false propositions imply all propositions, and true propositions
are implied by all propositions. [29, § 16]
An implicational paradox is intuitively, then, an implicational sentence with in
some sense unrelated antecedent and consequent; the truth of the implication
has nothing to do with the relation of content of its constituent parts, but
is solely due to the impoverished logical space considered. A remedy for the
paradoxes might therefore be found in a more opulent logical space.
The material implicational paradoxes were regarded by both MacCall
and Lewis to conclusively show that the material conditional does not express
entailment, and introduced the strict conditional as a better candidate for
this. This is the starting point for the school of relevant logics, initiated in the
1950s by Ackermann, but carried out to a whole research program by Ander-
son and Belnap. Although the logical space afforded by the strict conditional
undoubtedly is more opulent than that of the material conditional, it as well,
according to Anderson and Belnap, is infested with implicational paradoxes.
For instance, any logical truth is strictly entailed by every proposition, and ev-
ery logical falsehood entails every proposition. As a combined example of such
an implicational paradox is the Kleene axiom A ∧ ∼A  B ∨ ∼B which holds
true in classical, inuitionistic, as well as in the modal logics S1–S5, where 
is, respectively, the material, intuitionistic, and strict conditional. The Kleene
axiom will figure prominently throughout this paper.
To overcome such paradoxes, Anderson and Belnap set forth the variable
sharing property as a necessary property for A → B to be logically true.
Although the main thrust behind the latter two’s onslaught on classical as
well as intuitionistic and modal logic, was that such logics violate principles
of relevance, they also gave an analysis of enthymemes which they thought to
lend support to their choice of the logic E as the logic of entailment. They argue
in [4] that because the classical theory of enthymemes—the missing premise
theory—is correct, neither the material, nor the intuitionistic, nor the strict
conditional can express entailment. Here is a rather lengthy quote expressing
their view:
The present argument is simply this: both views make hash of the
distinction between logically valid arguments and enthymemes. For
on both theories we have as a “theorem of logic” a principle accord-
ing to which true premises aren’t really there at all (“true premises
may be suppressed”):
m
M & m ⊃ C
M ⊃ C.
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Suppose now that an argument is valid if and only if the correspond-
ing material or intuitionistic “implication” statement is true. Then,
since the argument from M and m to C is valid, M & m ⊃ C is
true; and since m is true as well and, hence, suppressible, M ⊃ C
is true; hence the argument from M to C is valid, and in precisely
the same sense as is the argument from M and m to C. But to say
that the argument from M to C is thus valid is in direct contradic-
tion to the doctrine that enthymematic arguments suppress required
premises. [4, pp. 714f]3
What Anderson and Belnap find wrong with the material, the intuition-
istic and the strict conditional is that all these allow one to suppress premises:
simply true ones in the first case, provably true in the second, and necessar-
ily true in the third case. Anderson and Belnap conclude that if entailment
proper, and not simply enthymematical implication, is to be expressible using
a conditional, then one needs a conditional and a logic which does not sanction
wholesale suppression. They contend that their favorite relevant logic E is the
best candidate for this job. The paper ends with the following (which they
claim to be an obvious truth):
If we are very careful, and always put down all the premises we need
(i.e., if we argue logically), then we arrive precisely at the formal
system E of logical implication [. . . ] or entailment. [4, p. 722]
Although the motivational story of enthymemes and suppression lived
on within the school of relevant logics, I think it is fair to say that it rarely
was treated as anything beyond this. On the proof-theoretic side, Anderson
and Belnap’s notion of a relevant deduction—that the premises must somehow
be used in obtaining the conclusion—took center stage, whereas the variable
sharing property—that for the conditional A → B, where → is the condi-
tional expressing entailment, to be logically true, A and B need to share a
propositional variable—took care of the semantical intuition that there need
to be some commonality of meaning between A and B if the first is to en-
tail the latter. The first property was regarded by Anderson and Belnap
as a necessary and sufficient property for preserving relevance in an argu-
ment, whereas the variable sharing property was regarded as necessary in this
regard.
There is another school—the Routley school—within relevant logic, how-
ever, going back to [28], which did not focus on Anderson and Belnap’s use-
criterion—precisified as the so-called Entailment Theorem—to the same ex-
tent. That tradition had a bent towards logics weaker than Anderson and
Belnap’s E. It is still claimed that the variable sharing property is a neces-
sary one, but the Entailment Theorem—Anderson and Belnap’s claim that
relevance-preserving arguments involve premise use in an essential way—is re-
3The same passage is also to be found in [3, p. 47]
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jected as a relevant criterion of entailment.4 Routley et al. [27, p. 232] further
deny that variable sharing can be strengthened “with other minor qualifica-
tions” so as to yield a sufficiency-criterion for relevance-preserving entailment.
Their main charge against the Anderson-Belnap tradition seems to be that this
tradition is claimed to hold a maximizing principle of logic choice: in the case
of R: choose the strongest paradox-free logic possible, and in the case of E:
choose the strongest paradox-free logic free of modal fallacies, where a modal
fallacy is any theorem A → B, where A expresses a contingent proposition,
whereas B expresses an entailment, and therefore a necessary proposition. It
was already noted by Urquhart in [32] that this is a gross misrepresentation
of Anderson and Belnap’s position. The interesting contribution, however, is
their insistence that the implicational paradoxes and variable sharing viola-
tion are a mere symptom of the more fundamental feature of suppression. To
quote Priest’s approval of their dictum: “the Routleys argue cogently that the
failure of relevance, in the technical sense, is but a symptom of suppression,
which is the fundamental malaise.” [19, p. 90]. Entailment is, according to the
Routley tradition, to be analyzed as a sufficiency relation, and so can’t be
suppressive; neither the material, nor the intuitionistic, nor the strict condi-
tional express such a sufficient relation, but at best an enthymematical, and
therefore suppressed, version of one such.
It was shown in [18] that even classical logic satisfies Anderson and Bel-
nap’s Entailment Theorem, and so the Routley tradition’s claim in this regard
was correct. Thus, since the variable sharing property fails for classical logic,
satisfying the Entailment Theorem can’t be upheld as a sufficient criterion for
relevancy if, as all within the relevant school seem in agreement it ought be,
the variable sharing property is upheld as necessary. Both properties, then,
can at best be regarded as necessary. The question rises, therefore, as to the
nature of relevance: Could suppression-freedom be spelled out in such a way
as to yield a sufficiency property for relevance?
The main aim of this paper is to analyze the Routley school’s treatment
of suppression. We will see that despite letting the notion of suppression gain
such an important role, the Routley tradition seems content with using the
notion without properly defining it. They do claim that a logic can have the
variable sharing property, yet have evidently suppressive principles. I will show,
however, that the proof given to this effect is glaringly fallacious. Furthermore,
we will see that two ways of making the notion of suppression precise—as what
is called the Anti-Suppression Principle and as the Joint Force Principle—
yield properties which, although they do rule out some, but not all, of the
4Under the heading for § 3.7 called Other—sometimes questionable or vacuous—criteria
for the choice of system Routley et al. argue in [27] against taking the Entailment Theorem,
or what they call Deduction Equivalence (DE), as a sufficient analysis of the notion of
coherence, that the logical theorems should cohere with the rules of the logic:
DE holds for a very large class of relevant, and also irrelevant, logics. In short,
the requirement offers little discriminatory power, indeed none that has not
already been independently motivated. [27, p. 258]
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paradoxes, are in fact much weaker than the variable sharing property. I will
then show that that principle is, like the variable sharing property, independent
of the so-called Ackermann Property—that A → (B → C) is not a theorem
for formulas A in which → does not occur.
Suppression precisified in such a way cannot therefore yield a notion of
suppression more fundamental, at least not entailment-wise, than the vari-
able sharing property, and so using it as a sufficient property for relevance
will not do. I will also look at another notion of suppression which Routley
et al. appealed to in arguing that even the three favorite logics of Ander-
son and Belnap, namely R, E and T, are suppressive. I will argue, however,
that that notion of suppression is tailor-fit to rule out only one logical prin-
ciple, namely the E-axiom ((A → A) → B) → B which [27] tendentiously
calls Suppression; indeed, one of the other principles clearly ruled out by
that notion of suppression, the reductio axiom (A → ∼A) → ∼A, was not
regarded as clearly suppressive, whereas the other principle which were so
regarded are clearly not. To obtain the strongest of Routley’s favorite log-
ics, DL, from E, one needs to chasten not only the suppression axiom, but
also
A ∧ B → (A ∧ B) C =df (C → C) → C
(A → B) → ((C → A) → (C → B)) prefixing
(A → B) → ((B → C) → (A → C)) suffixing
A ∧ (A → B) → B pseudo modus ponens
The claim made is not necessarily that all these axioms are suppressive,
only that R, E and T harbor suppressive logical principles. In their discussion
it is especially the contraction axioms, discussed in [27, § 3.9], in both the form
(A → (A → B)) → (A → B) as well as the weaker variant A ∧ (A → B) → B,
an axiom which is interderivable in all relevant logics with the contraction
rule, i.e. A → (A → B)  A → B, which is not argued to be suppressive, but
rather incorrect on other accounts than being suppressive. The suppressive
features of R, E and T must then be due to the first three axioms. I will
evaluate the arguments adduced to this effect finding them rather wanting. The
conclusion this paper draws, then, is that making freedom from suppression
the core notion of relevant entailment is, given the best available analysis of
what suppression is supposed to be, a dead end. However, analyzing entailment
as a sufficiency relation, need not be.
4. Guilty of Logical Suppression in the First Degree
The enthymeme-tradition was taken up by Richard Sylvan (né Richard Rout-
ley) and Val Plumwood (née Val Routley) in their joint paper The Semantics
of First Degree Entailment [28]. That paper is best known for having first
introduced the now well-known Routley-star operator which is used to give
an intensional semantics for negation. It is also, to my knowlegde, the first
work by either of these authors on enthymemes and logical suppression, and
spawned off a new school of relevant logics with a focus towards weaker logics
Vol. 14 (2020) Farewell to Suppression-Freedom 305
than Anderson and Belnap’s two favorite logics E and R. In it they claim that
a semantics for an implicational connective which forces no kind of suppression
will have to allow for the maximum variation principle:
for every proposition B which is not a consequence of A there is some
set-up which A is in to which B does not belong. Any violation of
this maximum variation principle will allow suppression somewhere.
[28, p. 341]
In fact, they take maximum variation, sufficiency of the antecedent to the
consequent and suppression-freedom to be logically equivalent notions [28,
p. 341]. They note, however, that a definition of logical consequence based
upon either of the latter two concepts would be circular, but nevertheless
hold that the latter two afford “a useful guide as to whether a suppression-
permitting implication has been confused with entailment.” [28, fn. 3]. Their
take on entailment, or logical consequence, is that it is to be analyzed as a
sufficiency relation; it is this which is conceptually basic whereas the notions
of maximum variation and suppression-freedom are the concepts used by the
Routleys to explicate the notion of a sufficiency relation.
[28] only deals with the semantics of the first-degree fragment of An-
derson and Belnap’s logic E. Thus the semantics only deals with formulas
generated from propositional variables and the connectives {∼,∧,∨} as well
as formulas A → B where A and B are themselves generated solely from the
three mentioned connectives. What is interesting, however, is that they man-
aged to prove the variable sharing property from the fact that their model
allows for maximum variation with respect to the given provability relation.
Since suppression-freedom is supposed to be equivalent to maximum varia-
tion, one might think that this lends credence to the thought that suppression-
freedom is the more fundamental property. This is precisely what the Routleys
claim:
Though elimination of suppression eliminates the paradoxes, elimi-
nation of the paradoxes and of relevance violations does not guaran-
tee absence of suppression, because certain limited kinds of suppres-
sion do not lead to relevance violations. Therefore the satisfaction of
relevance requirements is not itself sufficient to guarantee suitabil-
ity of an implication for interpretations which require suppression
freedom. [28, p. 359]
[28] undoubtedly made heavy use of the maximum variation principle
in spelling out the ideas of both suppression-freedom and entailment as a
sufficiency-relation. 10 years after the publication of that article, the notion
of suppression and its importance for relevance is taken up again in Relevant
Logics and Their Rivals [27]. That book deals primarily with logics without
degree-restrictions on →-formulas. However, the main material dealing with
suppression in that book is to be found in § 2.10 which is by and large a slight
modification of the account of suppression found in [28] and like it only pertains
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to the first-degree fragment.5 They do claim that “most of our general remarks
about the damaging nature of suppression and the reasons for avoiding it apply
equally to the higher degree forms.” [27, p. 142]. Regrettably, however, it is
never cleared up what does not apply.
The claim that suppression is of central importance and variable sharing
is not is also echoed throughout [27]. The following quote from the introduction
is representative:6,7
Though weak relevance is not a fundamental matter for entailment
[. . . ] but a derivative feature of a good sufficiency relation, it pro-
vides an extremely important formal test of adequacy. [27, p. 3]
Although the possibly different account of higher order suppression remains a
bit unclear, it is not any longer the model-theoretic maximum variation prin-
ciple which does the heaviest lifting in explicating the notion of a sufficiency
relation. Instead a principle of first degree suppression—both positive and
negative—is put forth and given a “syntactical characterization” as follows:
A is positively suppressed in B → C when B & A → C but not
B → C. Thus a statement is suppressed in an implication when, al-
though not stated as part of the antecedent and not a consequence of
the antecedent, it is presupposed in obtaining the consequent from
the antecedent. Positive suppression, which corresponds to the tradi-
tional notion of an enthymeme, can easily be rectified by conjoining
the suppressed statement to the insufficient antecedent, rendering
it sufficient. A is negatively suppressed [. . . ] where B → A ∨ C but
not B → C. [27, p. 142]
Since ∼C ∧ ∼A → ∼B and B → A ∨ C can be inferred from each other
in all the relevant logics under scrutiny, negative suppression of A in B → C,
reduces to positive suppression of ∼A in ∼C → ∼B. I will in the following
therefore not differentiate between positive and negative suppression. Let’s call
this kind of suppression extensional since it concerns extensional conjuncts of
antecedents of →-statements. The notion of suppression here is still less than
clear, however; what does it mean to claim that A is suppressed in B → C?
One could explain this as B is sufficient for C suppresses A when B ∧ A is
in fact sufficient for C, but B on its own isn’t. This, however, is still shy of
5 [27] is authored by Richard Routley as its main author, and with Val Plumwood, Robert
K. Meyer and Ross T. Brady as co-authors. The origin of the ideas regarding suppression
is to due to Plumwood, however: [27, p. 140, fn. 2] credits the material on first-degree
suppression as originating with Plumwood’s unpublished conference paper Some false laws
of logic, and subsequently modified by Plumwood and Sylvan. Neither of the other two
co-authors have, to my knowledge, endorsed Plumwood and Sylvan’s suppression-freedom
analysis of entailment in their own writings. Plumwood’s paper was read in 1967 at both
the Australian Association of Philosophy Conferences and at St. Andrews University [27,
p. 104, fn. 2]. I have, I’m sad to say, not been able to obtain a copy of Plumwood’s paper,
nor the paper presented in February 1969 at the Portsea Conference of the Melbourne De
Morgan Society a shortened version of which was eventually published as [28].
6By ‘weak relevance’ is here simply meant the variable sharing property.
7The claim that the variable sharing property is a mere negative test of relevancy is reiterated
in [20, p. 172].
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a workable definition which can be translated into a property of logics which
then can be compared to that of the variable sharing property. This, however,
is rectified by the syntactical principle called the Anti-Suppression Principle:
for every statement p there is some statement q such that the conse-
quences of q are a proper subset of the joint consequences of p and
q. There is no privileged class of statements which are generally
suppressible. [27, p. 146]
My suggestion for how to interpret their claim is that they claim that
at least a necessary requirement for a logic to be suppression-free is that it
satisfies the following property:8
Definition 2. A logic L satisfies the Anti-Suppressive Principle (ASP) just in
case for every formula A, there exist formulas B and C such that L A∧B → C,
but L B → C.
Lemma 1. ASP rules out both of the following implicational paradoxes:
A ∧ ∼A → B A → B ∨ ∼B
Proof. I’ll show that the latter is ruled out; the proof of the first is similar
only with added negation steps.
Assume that B → A ∨ ∼A is a theorem of a logic which satisfies ASP.
It follows that there are sentences B and C such that (A ∨ ∼A) ∧ B → C
is a logical theorem, while B → C is not. However, since  B → A ∨ ∼A,
 B → (A ∨ ∼A) ∧ B and so transitivity yields that  B → C. 
Note, again, that the above principle is formulated in [27] in the context
of the first degree fragment. However, a principle akin to ASP does appear
later in the book when the degree-restriction is lifted, under the name The
Joint Force Principle:
For every proposition p there is some other q such that p and q are
jointly sufficient for r but neither p nor q on its own is sufficient for
r. Formally, the Joint Force Principle says: (Pp)(Pq)(Pr)(p & q →
r & ∼(p → r) & ∼(q → r)).9 It tells us that the joint consequences
of propositions may be more than the sum of the consequences of
each. [27, p. 369]
8The Anti-Suppression Principle turns out to be equivalent to the principle used by Acker-
mann to explicate the sense of his rigorous implication when he writes that “the concept of
implication—understood as a logical connection between two statements—does not encom-
pass statements which imply or is implied by every other.” [1, p. 113] (my own translation).
Expanding further on this, however, will have to wait for another occasion.
9(Pq) is the existential propositional quantifier, whereas (p) is the universal one. There is
an obvious typo here as the first quantifier should have been the universal quantifier.
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This seems, intuitively at least, stronger than the Anti-Suppression Principle.
So as not to cause any confusion, let’s have this principle properly defined as
well:10
Definition 3. A logic L satisfies the Joint Force Principle (JFP) just in case
for every formula A, there exist formulas B and C such that L A ∧ B → C,
but L A → C and L B → C.
Since JFP is obviously at least as strong as ASP, it seems clear that if
suppression-freedom is not reducible to JFP, then at least they are committed
to the necessity of the principle in any analysis of entailment as a sufficiency
relation, and if JFP is not to be regarded as a sufficient property in and of itself,
then at least as a necessary ingredient of a sufficient set of clauses determining
what a sufficiency relation is.11
It is, then, possible to ask the following questions:
Question 1. Is the variable sharing property a derived feature of any sufficiency
relation for which JFP holds?
Question 2. Does JFP rule out the implicational paradoxes?
Question 3. Does JFP rule out the implicational paradoxes of the first degree?
Even though ASP and JFP do rule out some of the more common im-
plicational paradoxes, the correct answer to all of the above questions is no.
In fact, JFP turns out to be properly weaker than the so-called Weak Vari-
able Sharing Property and therefore fails to rule out implicational paradoxes
such as the Kleene axiom A ∧ ∼A → B ∨ ∼B as well as Dummett’s axiom
(A → B) ∨ (B → A), both of which apply to the first-degree fragment.
This, then, will show that the three concepts of maximum variation, suf-
ficiency of the antecedent to the consequent and suppression-freedom are in
fact not equivalent notions—not even in the first degree fragment—as claimed
by Plumwood and Sylvan in [28, p. 341] and reiterated in [27, p. 144]. Thus
extensional suppression-freedom cannot function as a means of explicating the
conceptually fundamental notion, namely entailment understood as a suffi-
ciency relation, which is the stated goal within the Routley tradition. The
10Note that it is also possible to interpret the latter principle as the stronger claim that for
every A there exist formulas B and C such that L A ∧ B → C, and L ∼(A → C) and L
∼(B → C). This, however, seems to be too strong: firstly, since both of Routley’s two favorite
logics DK and DL have the classical two-valued Boolean algebra as one of their models where
→ is simply interpreted as ⊃, neither of these two logics can satisfy this principle. If, however,
these logics are augmented with an explicit propositional contradiction, which is in fact how
DK is presented in [24] and DL in [26], this argument doesn’t apply. It is still quite doubtful
that such a logic satisfies the principle. Regardless of this, however, it seems that the principle
is too strong: the logic DJ is a proper sublogic of both of Routley’s favorite logics DK and
DL, and it would be natural to suppose that if DK and DL are suppression-free in that they
satisfy the Joint Force Principle, then so will any sublogic of these logics, and therefore also
DJ. However, DJ does not satisfy this stronger property simply because it has no theorems
of the form ∼(A → B) [9, p. 159]. I will therefore set this interpretation aside.
11I haven’t been able to decide the question whether JFP is properly stronger than ASP
and so leave this as an open question.
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explanation, then, for why the variable sharing property is provable for the
first degree fragment is because of the semantic theory, that is, because of
maximum variation, and not because of freedom from suppression.
I will now provide the proofs which show that no is indeed the correct
answer to all of the above questions. Before we begin, we need to properly
define the two variable sharing properties:
Definition 4. A logic L has the Variable Sharing Property (VSP) just in case
for every formula A and B, L A → B only if A and B share a propositional
parameter.
VSP was formulated in [6] where it was shown that E had VSP. Later it
was remarked that Belnap’s eight-element algebraic model which he used to
prove his theorem, in fact also validates the assertion axiom
(CI) A → ((A → B) → B),
and therefore validates all of R, and hence that also R has VSP.
The logic RM is obtained from R by adding the mingle axiom
(M) A → (A → A).
Dunn and Meyer began investigating this logic in the late 1960’s. To their
surprise, however, they found that RM does not have VSP as ∼(A → A) →
(B → B) as well as the Kleene axiom turned out to be logical theorems of
RM [14]. Meyer, then, showed that RM has the following weaker property:12
Definition 5. A logic L has the Weak Variable Sharing Property (WVSP) just
in case for every formula A and B, L A → B only if either A and B share a
propositional parameter, or both L ∼A and L B.
One of the implicational paradoxes was that ‘of any two propositions
there must be one which implies the other’ [29, § 16]. One of the logical theo-
rems of RM expresses precisely this, namely Dummett’s axiom
(D) (A → B) ∨ (B → A).
Under the heading Why we don’t like mingle, Anderson and Belnap quote The
Divine Comedy ’s “All hope abandon, ye who enter in!”, their view being that
if → is to express “if . . . , then ”, then Dummett’s axiom can’t be a logical
theorem. Dummett’s axiom was in fact introduced by Skolem in 1913 [33,
p. 154], notably as equivalent, given intuitionistic logic, to Skolem’s axiom:13
(Sko) (A ∧ B → C) → (A → C) ∨ (B → C).
12The proof of this is to be found in [2, p. 417].
13Since it is too late to rename Dummett’s axiom, I suggest that this axiom, which is
not, according to [33, p. 155], mentioned by Dummett, should be called Skolem’s axiom.
Skolem’s axiom obviously entails Dummett’s axiom even in the weak relevant logic BB (hint
for getting the derivation rolling: let C be A ∧ B). However, Dummett’s axiom does not
entail Skolem’s axiom even in DW. I leave the verification of this also as a MaGICal exercise.
Note, however, that Dummett’s and Skolem’s axioms are equivalent in BB augmented so as
to validate reasoning by cases, that A ∨ B  C if both A  C and B  C (which in fact
is the rule that Skolem [30, p. 62] used in showing that Skolem’s axiom is derivable from
Dummett’s axiom). I leave the proof to the reader.
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[27, p. 269, fn. 1] denounced this principle as a principle which “for every
proposition denies the Joint Force Principle.” This, however, is a poor ren-
dering of their principle, the denial of which is that there exists a formula A
such that for all B’s and C’s, if A ∧ B → C is a logical theorem, then so
is either A → C or B → C; Skolem’s axiom on its own does not suffice for
deriving either A → C or B → C as logical theorems under the proviso that
A∧B → C is a logical theorem. Nor is Skolem’s axiom, as we shall see, in any
way incompatible with upholding JFP.
Theorem 1. WVSP entails JFP
Proof. Assume that L has WVSP, but not JFP. Then there is some A such
that for every B and C, if  A ∧ B → C, then either  A → C or  B → C.
Let C be A ∧ B and let B be a propositional variable which does not occur
in A. Then since  A ∧ B → A ∧ B, either  A → A ∧ B or  B → A ∧ B.
It follows that either  A → B or  B → A. However, since A and B do not
share any propositional variables, it follows from WVSP that  B if  A → B
and  ∼B if  B → A. Neither alternative can be true since B was assumed
to be a propositional variable. 
Theorem 2. JFP does not entail WVSP.
Proof. Let SIE (Suppressive Irrelevant E ) be the logic E with the axiom of
intensional Paradox, Kleene’s axiom, Skolem’s axiom, disjunctive syllogism,
as well as the Anti Joint-Force rule added:
(iP ) (A → A) → ∼(B → ∼B) ∨ ∼(∼B → B)
(M2) ∼(A → A) → (B → B)
(Ka) A ∧ ∼A → B ∨ ∼B
(Sko) (A ∧ B → C) → (A → C) ∨ (B → C)
(AJFr) A ∧ B → C,∼(B → C)  A → C
(R9) A,∼A ∨ B  B
SIE does not have WVSP since ∼(A → A) is not one of its logical theorems
although (iP) is. However, it does satisfy JFP: Consider the model in Fig. 1.14
Let A be any formula and assign every propositional variable in it to either
1 or 2. It is easy to check that {1, 2} is a subalgebra so that A ∈ {1, 2} as
well. Let B be a propositional variable and assign 0 to it, and further let C be
A ∧ B. Then  A ∧ B → C, but A → C = 0. By simply reassigning B to 3
Note also that VSP does not on its own rule out Dummett’s axiom: it was shown
in [23, prop. 6.19] that if one weakens the logic B by replacing the contraposition rule
A → ∼B  B → ∼A by modus tollens, i.e. the rule A → B, ∼B  ∼A, then the resultant
logic has the VSP even when Dummett’s axiom is added (they only state that the suffixing
rule holds in their model MDF68, but is easy to verify that also the independent prefixing
rule (R4) does, and so their model validates all of B, except for the contraposition rule).
14All models displayed in this paper have been found with the aid of MaGIC—an acronym for
Matrix Generator for Implication Connectives—which is an open source computer program
created by John K. Slaney [31]. All models will be displayed as Fig. 1 with a set of designated
elements T , a displayed ordering and the matrices for at least → and ∼. ∧ and ∨ are to be
interpreted as greatest lower bound and least upper bound relative to the displayed ordering.
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Figure 1. A model for SIE
one then gets that B → C = 0. Since the algebraic models are sound with
regards to SIE it follows that  A → C and  B → C which therefore ends
the proof that SIE satisfies JFP. 
Corollary 1. JFP does not rule out all first-degree implicational paradoxes.
Proof. SIE validates both the Kleene axiom and Dummett’s axiom, and so its
first-degree fragment validates these as well despite it having JFP. 
This section has shown that the notion of extensional suppression does
not suffice for ruling out the implicational paradoxes. The short next section
will show that this is also the case when strengthening the requirement to also
encompass the Ackermann Property.
5. The Ackermann Property: A Digression
There is another property which is sometimes held forth as an important prop-
erty for entailment-logics to have, namely the Ackermann Property :
Definition 6. A logic L satisfies the Ackermann Property (AP) just in case
L has no logical theorems on the form A → (B → C) where A is a →-free
formula.
The property was designed to guard against so-called fallacies of modal-
ity, and not against fallacies of relevance. Failures of the Ackermann Property
are, according to [5, p. 44], fallacies of modality because they express that “en-
tailments follow from, or are entailed by, contingent propositions.” Anderson
and Belnap defined the modal operators using →: A =df (A → A) → A,
and ♦A =df ∼∼A. In order to get suitable modal principles to hold, the
logic has to be quite strong; stronger than what the Routley tradition thought
acceptable. Still, the Routley tradition did insist on the validity of the Acker-
mann Property in the case where → is to express entailment [27, p. 223]. I will
not discuss this further; the main purpose of the following is only to make the
connections, or lack thereof, between the Ackermann Property and extensional
suppression. Later I will demonstrate a similar result pertaining to intensional
suppression.
Theorem 3. VSP does not entail AP.
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Figure 2. A model for Π′
Proof. This is a well-known result. The logic R has the variable sharing prop-
erty, although not the Ackermann Property since it validates the assertion
axiom A → ((A → B) → B). 
The question, then, is whether the Ackermann Property entails ASP or
JFP. The answer is ‘no’, as the following theorem shows:
Theorem 4. AP does not entail ASP.
Proof. Let Π′ be the logic Π′ with the Kleene axiom added as well as Inten-
sional Strong Excluded Middle axiom:
(Ka) A ∧ ∼A → B ∨ ∼B
(iSEM) A → ∼(B → ∼B) ∨ ∼(∼B → B).
Because of the (iSEM)-axiom, Π′ does not satisfy ASP. However, it does
have the Ackermann Property. This is seen by noting that the model in Fig. 2
is a model for Π′.15 Let A be any formula built from propositional variables
using {∼,∨,∧}. Assign 4 to every such variable. A will then be assigned to
either 1 or 4. For such an evaluation of A, however, the model falsifies A →
(B → C) for every formula B and C, which therefore ends the proof that Π′
has the Ackermann Property. 
Corollary 2. JFP together with AP do not rule out all first-degree implicational
paradoxes.
Proof. Let L be the intersection of Π′ and SIE. It follows from the proofs of
Theorem 2 and Theorem 4 that L satisfies both JFP and AP despite having
A ∧ ∼A → B ∨ ∼B as a logical theorem. 
We have in this short section seen that the Ackermann Property is inde-
pendent of the Joint Force Principle. We saw, however that their combination
can’t be the final analysis of suppression if this is to be, as Routley et al. ar-
gue, the “fundamental matter for entailment”, from which the variable sharing
property is “but a derivative feature” [27, p. 3]. Note, then, that some of their
claims with regards to suppression is clearly not captured by the extensional
notion of suppression. The next section therefore looks at another notion of
15It is in fact Ackermann’s model from [1, § 6] which he used to show that Π′ has the
Ackermann Property.
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suppression which is appealed to in order to rule that even Anderson and
Belnap’s three favorite logics, T, E and R, harbor suppressive principles.
6. Speak of the Devil and He Doth Appear: The Rhetorics of
Suppression
We saw in the previous sections that both attempts at making the notion of
suppression-freedom precise yielded a principle properly weaker than that of
variable sharing. The Routley tradition never, as far as I know, made any
attempts at comparing the different notions of relevance, settling rather for
arguing against what can at best be seen as an imprecise notion of suppres-
sion. Furthermore, although they often claim that variable sharing is a mere
byproduct of a good sufficiency relation, the proper analysis of which is via
suppression-freedom, hardly any evidence is conjured up to support this view.
They do make two substantial claims with regards to the relationship
between suppression and the VSP:
1. There are logics stronger than Anderson and Belnap’s favorite logics T,
E and R which are clearly suppressive despite satisfying VSP.
2. T, E and R are themselves suppressive.
The notion of suppression here can’t be that of extensional suppression if that
is cashed out as either ASP or JFP since we saw in the last section that both
these are even properly weaker than WVSP. Routley et al., however, seem
to suggest that there are suppression principles which are not captured by
these two principles. This section tries to hone in on what this new notion
of suppression can be taken to be, and whether it, or it together with some
extensional notion, yields a notion of suppression which truly classifies T, E
and R as suppressive. Although we will see that the intensional variants of
ASP and JFP do this, I will argue that even when taken in conjunction, the
extensional and intensional notions of suppression do not do the job intended
by Routley et al., namely to provide an analysis of what a good sufficiency
relation is. Furthermore, the intensional notions of suppression do not rule out
all the principles deemed suppressive by Routley et al., and the reason for
adopting them seem less than clear.
Before we get to intensional suppression, however, let’s look at the evi-
dence given by Routley et al. for the claim that there are logics stronger than
T, E and R which are obviously suppressive despite having the variable sharing
property, namely the second part of Theorem 3.15 ([27, p. 231]):
FalseClaim. Both E and R extended by either of the rules
(I) A → (B ∧ (D → D) → C)  A → (B → C)
(II) A → (B ∧ t → C)  A → (B → C)
where t represents the conjunction of theorems of E or R, has the Variable
Sharing Property.
The alleged proof of this claim is that the resultant logics still have Bel-
nap’s eight-element model of relevance as one of its models. As we shall see,
314 T. F. Øgaard Log. Univers.
however, that is plainly false. Since t → (D → D) holds in all relevant log-
ics (all which are endowed with the Ackermann truth constant t, that is),
A → (B ∧ (D → D) → C) suffices for deriving A → (B ∧ t → C). Adding the
first rule, therefore, yields the weaker logic, and so I will only consider this.
The following theorem shows that (I) is in fact incompatible with not only
VSP, but also ASP:
Theorem 5. No logic extending BB satisfies ASP if augmented by (I).
Proof. Assume that L extends BB augmented by (I), but that L has ASP.
Let A be the formula (B ∧ (C → C)) → (C → C). From Ax1 we then
have that L A → (B ∧ (C → C) → (C → C)), and so (I) yields L A →
(B → (C → C)). Since A itself is a logical theorem, modus ponens yields that
L B → (C → C).
Since we have assumed that L has ASP, we also know that there are
formulas D and E such that L D ∧ (C → C) → E, but L D → E. However,
we have just seen that D → (C → C) is a logical theorem of L, and so using
the BB-rule R6, we then get that D → D ∧ (C → C) is a logical theorem.
Using the transitivity of →, we then get that L D → E which then ends the
proof. 
Note here that we do not need all of BB[I] for this proof to go through.
Negation does not figure in the proof, and so the positive fragment suffices. The
transitivity rules R3 & R4 can furthermore be replaced by a mere transitivity
rule, and that it suffices that the rules are admissible so as to be theorem-
preserving.
What is notable about (I) and (II) is that neither of them seem to be
instances of either positive or negative suppression. What might seem as in-
stances of extensional suppression are the commuted variants of (I) and (II),
namely
(Ic) B ∧ (D → D) → (A → C)  B → (A → C)
(IIc) B ∧ t → (A → C)  B → (A → C)
It seems, however, that branding any instances of these rules suppressive too
easily allows one to eliminate logics; for instance, both TM and RM validate
the rule (B ∧ (B → B)) → (B → B)  B → (B → B), but even if one agrees
with Anderson and Belnap’s judgment over mingle axiom, it seems wrong to
shun it because the noted rule holds.16 After all, even B  A → (A → A)
holds in these logics. This, however, is none-the-less what Routley et al. claim:
“A → (A → A) comes from A & (A → A) → (A → A) by suppression of
A → A” [27, p. 241]. This, then, is the trouble with the intuitive notion of
suppression which Routley et al. use to marshal against, in their point of view,
adverse logical principles: any rule of the general form B ∧ A → C  B → C,
or even any convoluted variant such as D → (B ∧A → C)  D → (B → C) or
E → (D → (B ∧ A → C))  E → (D → (B → C)), etc., can, just as long as
A satisfies some desiderata such as being true, necessary true, provably true,
16Note that even though RM does not satisfy VSP, TM does (see [16, Cor. 4.6] for a proof).
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or provably true entailment, be regarded as a suppressive rule. However, all
the logics considered by Routley et al. allow one to suppress any A suitably
→-entailed by B, so that any of the “suppressive” inference schemes above
are pieces of valid inference just as long as B → A is a theorem of the logic
in question. On the other side, B ∧ A → B  B → B holds in all logics
even though A need not in any way be related to B, nor be true, provable or
the like. The sober judgment, then, seems rather to be that this loose sense of
suppression can’t really be used to either determine or in any way circumscribe
the extension of the consequence relation.
It seems, then, that to get a workable notion of suppression stronger than
JFP, which would not only entail the variable sharing property, but also rule
the Anderson-Belnap logics T, E and R as suppressive, one would need to go
beyond the extensional notion of suppression. Relevant logics are sometimes
equipped with not just an extensional conjunction, but also an intensional
one; the binary ◦ connective called fusion defined by the residuation rules
A → (B → C)  A ◦ B → C and A ◦ B → C  A → (B → C). Now amongst
the four authors of [27], at least Brady and Routley wanted to adopt a logic
which could handle the näıve theories of truth, classes and sets non-trivially.
Both adopted logics containing the axiom (A → B) ∧ (B → C) → (A → C).
However, [27, pp. 366f] showed that any such logic which also has the fusion
connective will trivialize all of the mentioned näıve theories.17 Fusion was
therefore not adopted as a logical connective. One may, however, still try to
work out a notion of suppression which restricts not only rules on the form
B ∧ A → C  B → C, but also B → (A → C)  B → C. Finding a criterion
for which such rules to deem suppressive, will then, just as in the extensional
case, be the hard task.
Such a notion of suppression is precisely what is appealed to in [27,
§§ 3.8–3.9]. It is this notion of suppression which is appealed to when ruling
out most of the principles which differentiates the Anderson-Belnap logics from
Routley’s two favorite logics DK and DL:
A more detailed examination of the characteristics and principles of
systems E and R confirms this presumption. Both systems contain
many incorrect and defective principles and qualified suppression
principles. [27, p. 263]
Their judgement is even reflected in the name they give to one of the
defining axioms of E: the axiom ((A → A) → B) → B is named Suppression.
In what follows I will go through their reasons for thinking that the following
five axioms of E, the latter three also belonging to T, are suppressive:
((A → A) → B) → B E-axiom
A ∧ B → (A ∧ B) C =df (C → C) → C
(A → B) → ((C → A) → (C → B)) Prefixing
(A → B) → ((B → C) → (A → C)) Suffixing
(A → ∼A) → ∼A Reductio
17For more relevant triviality proofs using fusion, see [17, §§ 6 & 9].
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The reason ((A → A) → B) → B is called Suppression to begin with is
that, according Routley et al., it suppresses A → A in ((A → A) → B) →
((A → A) → B). The intuition behind this is give as follows:
A leading feature of the Peripatetic theory of implication [. . . ], which
aimed at giving an account of what may be called progressive rea-
soning, was rejection of the decidedly non-progressive principle of
Identity, A → A. Thus it is true that
(1) If A → A then (as a matter of logic) the Peripatetic
theory of implication18 is wrong: i.e. (A → A) → B for the wff B
given.
But (1) does not imply that the Peripatetic theory is wrong,
i.e. (1) → B is false. (As the counterexample plainly shows the law of
Identity is illegitimately suppressed19.) Identity has been taken not
merely as true, but as unchallengeable, as not open to rejection. [. . . ]
No proposition, not even the law of Identity, should be so protected
from questioning and doubt. Of course this sort of protection is just
the shielding suppression affords. [27, p. 267]
I find it hard to connect the idea that no proposition is beyond doubt
and the claim that ((A → A) → B) → B expresses that this is in fact not so,
namely that A → A is beyond doubt: if (A → A) → B is indeed true, then it
seems that B is true as well, since, after all, A → A is true. Furthermore, if the
parenthesized “as a matter of logic” means that (A → A) → B is logically true,
it would, presumably at least, make B logically true as well, since A → A is
logically true. Of course, that is not to say that either B or A → A are beyond
doubt, only that one ought to revise ones commitment to the latter if one comes
to think the Peripatetic theory of implication is indeed true. One ought, if one
so does while at the same time retains ones commitment to modus ponens, to
revise ones belief in the E-axiom as well, seeing as A → A is in fact derivable
using this axiom:
(1) (((A → A) → (A → A)) → (A → A)) → (A → A) E-axiom
(2) ((A → A) → (A → A)) → (A → A) E-axiom
(3) A → A 1, 2, MP
However, unless one already has reasons for thinking that the Peripatetic the-
ory is indeed true, I don’t see why one ought to revise the belief in a principle
antithetical to that theory. I therefore find the argument here less than per-
suasive.
Since the target of the Routley et al.’s argument, ((A → A) → B) → B,
is even called Suppression, it seems that one might miss something vital re-
garding their notion of suppression if the argument is tossed aside so abruptly,
however. I suggest, therefore, that we simply bracket off the reasons given for
thinking that the E-axiom is suppressive in order to better understand Routley
18The salient feature of that theory is the claim that A → A fails to be true for all A’s. See
[7, § 8.2] for some discussion of it.
19Sylvan’s review of [2], in which the passage thus far quoted first appeared, notably adds
“: thus the → of E fails to represent logical sufficiency.” [25, p. 407].
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et al.’s notion of suppression. It is evidently not suppressive in the extensional
sense brought out by the Anti-Suppession and Joint Force Principles. I there-
fore suggest that the E-axiom is best viewed as an archetypal instance of an
altogether different notion of suppression, which I will designate intensional
suppression. We have seen that the notion of extensional suppression turned
out to be properly weaker than variable sharing, and so that notion of sup-
pression can’t be used to rule E and R suppressive, but this intensional sense
of suppression might.
Now ((A → A) → B) → B is obtained, or so the story goes, from
((A → A) → B) → ((A → A) → B) by suppressing A → A. The relevant
form of this intensional sense of suppression, therefore, seems to be that even
though B → (A → C) is a theorem, where A is a theorem as well, B → C need
not be. Maybe this notion, or maybe it together with the extensional notion
of suppression, might turn out strong enough to indeed rule the Anderson-
Belnap logics to be suppressive and yield the variable sharing property as a
derivable feature. Let’s therefore define the intensional variant of both the
Anti-Suppression and the Joint Force Principles:
Definition 7. A logic L satisfies the Intensional Anti-Suppression Principle
(IASP) just in case for every formula A, there exist formulas B and C such
that L B → (A → C), but L B → C.
Definition 8. A logic L satisfies the Intensional Joint Force Principle (IJFP)
just in case for every formula A, there exist formulas B and C such that
L B → (A → C), but L B → C and L A → C.
Now the E-axiom can obviously not be a logical theorem of any logic
with any of these two properties. Thus both properties rule both E and R to
be suppressive. The question, then, is whether any of the principles do the
job of also branding the other mentioned E-axioms as suppressive. Apart from
Reductio, which I will get back to, this is not the case, as the following theorem
shows:
Theorem 6. L satisfies IJFP, where L is identified TW plus
(Ax12) (A → B) ∧ (B → C) → (A → C)
(Ax13) A ∨ ∼A
(Ax15) (A → (A → B)) → (A → B)
(Ax17) A ∧ B → (A ∧ B)
(R9) A,∼A ∨ B  B
(R10) A  ∼(A → ∼A)
(M) A → (A → A)
(M2) ∼(A → A) → (B → B)
(Ka) A ∧ ∼A → B ∨ ∼B
(Sko) (A ∧ B → C) → (A → C) ∨ (B → C)
Proof. Consider the model for L depicted in Fig. 3. S = {2, 3} is here a sub-
algebra and therefore closed under all propositional functions. But then if A
is any formula and all its propositional variables are assigned to elements in
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Figure 3. A model for L of Theorem 6
S, A will be evaluated to some element in the subalgebra as well. Let B be
a propositional variable. Then the model falsifies A → B by assigning B to
0, since 2 → 0 = 3 → 0 = 0. Furthermore, if one assigns B to 4, then since
(2 → 4) → 4 = (3 → 4) → 4 = 0, the model with such an evaluation of B also
falsifies (A → B) → B. Thus for propositional variables B and any formula
A, even though L has (A → B) → (A → B) as a theorem, neither A → B nor
(A → B) → B are logical theorems which then ends the proof that L satisfies
IJFP. 
Theorem 7. The combination of IJFP, JFP and AP does not suffice for ruling
out the implicational paradoxes, not even the first degree ones, nor do they
suffices for yielding WVSP.
Proof. Let L be the logic TW plus the following principles:
(Ax12) (A → B) ∧ (B → C) → (A → C)
(Ax13) A ∨ ∼A
(Ax17) A ∧ B → (A ∧ B)
(Ka) A ∧ ∼A → B ∨ ∼B
(iP ) (A → A) → ∼(B → ∼B) ∨ ∼(∼B → B)
L is a sublogic of SIE of Theorem 2 which satisfied JFP. It is also a sublogic
of Π′ of Theorem 4 which satisfied AP. Thus L has both these properties.
That it also satisfied IJFP can be seen by considering the model for L in
Fig. 4. Let A be any formula and assign to every propositional variable in it
either 1 or 2. It is easy to check that {1, 2} is closed under every propositional
function, and so A will be assigned to either 1 or 2. Let B be a propositional
variable and assign it to 0. Then both A → B and (A → B) → B will be
assigned to 1 which is not a designated value. Since (A → B) → (A → B), it
follows that L has IJFP.
Thus L has all three properties, yet validates the Kleene axiom. Thus
the combination of the three properties does not suffice for ruling out the
implicational paradoxes even of the first degree. Furthermore, since L has (iP)
as an axiom it can’t have WVSP since ∼(A → A) is not one of its theorems. 
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Figure 4. A model for L of Theorem 7
The above theorem shows, then, that strengthening the notion of sup-
pression so as to include both the extensional and intensional versions of the
Joint Force Principle as well as the Ackermann Property, is still not enough to
rule out the implicational paradoxes—even the first degree such. Furthermore,
that even though IJFP, unlike JFP, yields a relevance criterion not implied by
the already available ones as it does classify the E-axiom as suppressive, the
combination of anti-suppressive principles considered so far fails to do one of
the jobs Routley et al. intended suppression to do, namely to rule out all of
the following as suppressive:
((A → A) → B) → B E-axiom
A ∧ B → (A ∧ B) (C =df (C → C) → C) ∧ -axiom
(A → B) → ((C → A) → (C → B)) Prefixing
(A → B) → ((B → C) → (A → C)) Suffixing
I will get back to the reasons given for thinking that the three latter
axioms are suppressive. Before that, however, we should consider whether there
are principles which are intuitively not suppressive, but which are classified as
such by IJFP.
One of Routley’s favorite logic was DK. If augmented by the counter-
example rule A  ∼(A → ∼A) (equivalently A,∼B  ∼(A → B)), one obtains
the logic DR introduced in [8] which is the strongest logic Brady considers
which has the Depth Variable Sharing Property.20 These two logics satisfy all
the relevance- and anti-suppression properties discussed in this paper:
20Roughly, if  A → B, then A and B share a propositional variable at the same →-
depth. Note that this property in fact rules out all these four axioms above, as well as
Reductio. The property was first introduced in [8]—published in 1984, but initially received
by the journal in 1980, and so two year prior to the publication of [27]. However, depth
relevance is, as far as I have found, only mentioned twice in [27]: once in the tentative table of
content for the planned second volume of Relevant Logics and their Rivals—§ 15.6: “Further
conditions for adequacy on choice of logics of inference and deducibility: depth relevance”
[27, p. ix]—and once on its last page of the main text (p. 406) where it is advertised that
the “leading D systems” will be shown to have “the important feature of depth relevance”
in the planned § 15.6. Note, however, that Routley et al. do mention so-called Deep logics,
or Deeper logics. These are identified as logics without the ESyll axioms ([27, p. 226]) and
supposedly “treat all statements [. . . ] as non-suppressible” [27, p. 141]. DK and DL are
mentioned as examples of such deep logics, but beyond this, however, the term was never
precisified. Brady does identify deep relevant logics and depth relevant logics in [7, p. 195],
but it seems better to view the latter as a successor-concept since DL is not depth relevant.
I find it doubtful that depth relevance would fit as an analysis of the topic of this paper,
namely Routley et al.’s notion of suppression, and since they so emphatically reject that the
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Corollary 3. DK and DR satisfy the following properties: IJFP, JFP, AP, as
well as VSP.
Proof. Since these two logics are sublogic of E they satisfy JFP, AP, as well
as VSP. Furthermore, since they are sublogics of the logic in Theorem 6, it
follows that they also satisfy IJFP. 
Not only does the logic in Theorem 6 validate all of DR, it also validates
all of Anderson and Belnap’s E, shy of the axioms ((A → A) → B) → B and
(A → ∼A) → ∼A. The first of these is obviously intensionally suppressive
in the sense that any logic with this principle will fail to satisfy IJFP. What
about the latter principle, Reductio? DR only validates Reductio as a two-way
rule, that is A → ∼A  ∼A, holds in DR—the rule is equivalent to excluded
middle—as well as the contraposed version A  ∼(A → ∼A). DR does not,
however, validate the Reductio axiom, and so the question remains whether
DL—Routley’s other favorite logic got from DK by replacing excluded middle
by Reductio—satisfies IJFP. Routley et al. did express some reservations to-
wards this axiom, although I must confess that I fint it hard to get a clear idea
of their reasons why. It is discussed in the the same section as contraction, so
let’s first see why they thought contraction not to hold.
One might have thought that the contraction axiom involves some kind
of suppression; that (A → (A → B)) → (A → B) is got from (A → (A →
B)) → (A → (A → B)) by suppressing an A. However, we saw in Theorem 6
that the contraction axiom can be an axiom of quite strong logics which satisfy
IJFP. Routley et al. do not charge contraction, nor the weaker rule version or
its equivalent axiom form A∧ (A → B) → B (called Ass by Routley et al.), of
suppression. Their main argument against contraction is rather that it limits
the logical space to non-paradoxical situations, and therefore trivialize self-
referential theories such as näıve truth, property and set theory [27, § 3.9].21
Since “Reductio, (A → ∼A) → ∼A, does not exclude situations in the same
way or to the same extent as Ass [...].”, Routley et al. state that “in systemic
investigations we shall generally carry Reduction as an optional extra.” [27,
p. 282].22
variable sharing property, even with “minor qualifications”, should be viewed as a central
feature of entailment [27, p. 232], I will not discuss depth relevance further.
21The other reasons adduced against contraction are that such principles require extra mod-
elling conditions which there are no compelling reason to accept; have complex and “remote”
modelling conditions; yield undecidability. These reasons do not relate to suppression, and
so I will not discuss them further.
22They do mention the link between Contraction and Reductio, namely that Reductio is an
instance of the contraction axiom in minimal logic. This, however, is not the case in E in
which the reductio and contraction axioms are independent ( [2, § 26.2]). Furthermore, in
order to obtain Reductio from Contraction one needs not only the instance ((∼A → ∼A) →
∼A) → ∼A of the E-axiom, but also the instance ∼A → ((∼A → ∼A) → ∼A) of R’s
assertion axiom (Ax11) which is not a theorem of E. Negation in logics where both these
hold is implicational, in that every ∼-formula is equivalent to a →-formula. This is not the
case in E, and therefore not the case in weaker logics than E either. This has probably been
noted before, but as I haven’t been able to find a proof of it (a partial discussion is found
in [2, § 14.3]), let me note that this follows from the fact that the model for E in Fig. 5 is
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Figure 5. A model for E
One might have thought that since they state that Reductio is equivalent
to the axiom (A → B)∧ (A → ∼B) → ∼A ([27, p. 229]), and furthermore that
in logics such as DK only (A → B)∧ (A → ∼B) → (∼(B ∧∼B) → ∼A) holds,
that they suspected Reductio to involve some form of suppression. What they
say, however, is that
without a Commutation Rule, such as δ23, there is no way of sup-
pressing ∼(B & ∼B) in its internally nested position and arriving,
as in system E, at (A → B) ∧ (A → ∼B) → ∼A. [27, p. 282]
One way of deriving (A → B) ∧ (A → ∼B) → ∼A provided both (A →
B) ∧ (A → ∼B) → (∼(B ∧ ∼B) → ∼A) and ∼(B ∧ ∼B) are theorems, would
be to use δ. It is false, however, that some form of commutation is needed : one
can also use Reductio together with Conjunctive Syllogism (Ax12), neither
of which are classified as commutative principles. Furthermore, Routley at al.
argue Ax12 to be the correct form of transitivity and therefore non-suppressive,
and so if ∼(B ∧ ∼B) is suppressed in (A → B) ∧ (A → ∼B) → ∼A, it
would seem that it is Reductio which has to be the culprit. The easiest way to
see that Reductio, at least in the presence of Ax12, does involves intensional
suppression modeled after the E-axiom, is by realizing that (A∨∼A → B) → B
is a theorem of DL. Both A → A and A∨∼A were regarded as logical theorems
by Routley et al., and so it seems that Reductio allows one to suppress A∨∼A
from (A ∨ ∼A → B) → (A ∨ ∼A → B) to obtain (A ∨ ∼A → B) → B in
the same way that the E-axiom allows one to suppress A → A from ((A →
A) → B) → ((A → A) → B). I think this shows clearly that Routley et al.
ought to have judged Reductio suppressive since they so emphatically judged
the E-axiom to be suppressive. The following theorem and corollary simply
shows that IASP in fact fails under the conditions mentioned.
Theorem 8. No extension of BB plus the three axioms
Ax8 (A → ∼B) → (B → ∼A)
Ax12 (A → B) ∧ (B → C) → (A → C)
Ax14 (A → ∼A) → ∼A
satisfies IASP.
such that ∼0 = 2, but 2 is not to be found in the matrix for →. For a more philosophical
discussion of negation as implicational in the context of relevant logics, see [15].
23The rule A → (B → C), B  A → C.
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Proof. This follows simply by noting that (A∨∼A → C) → C is a theorem of
any such logic.24 Thus for any B and C, if  B → (A ∨ ∼A → C), then also
 B → C. 
As an immediate corollary to the above theorem we get the following:
Corollary 4. DL does not satisfy IASP.
We have earlier seen that the extensional notions of suppression are
eclipsed by even weak variable sharing (Theorems 1 and 2), and that the
Ackermann Property is independent from ASP (Theorems 3 and 4). The fol-
lowing theorem shows that IJFP is in fact independent from both VSP and
AP:
Corollary 5. IJFP, VSP and AP are all independent.
Proof. • The logic of Theorem 6 satisfies IJFP, but since it has the Mingle
axiom it fails to satisfy both AP and since it validates the Kleene axiom
it fails to satisfy VSP.
• TM, T with A → (A → A) added, satisfies VSP ([16, Cor. 4.6]). Because
of Mingle, however, it does not satisfy AP and because of Reductio it
does not satisfy IJFP (Theorem 8).
• Since E satisfies AP, that property does not entail IJFP since ((A →
A) → B) → B is a theorem of E. Nor does it entail VSP (Theorem 4)

We have so far seen that the anti-suppression properties fail to rule out the
implicational paradoxes—even the first degree such. Furthermore, they classify
principles claimed not to be clearly suppressive—Reductio—as suppressive, yet
fail to capture what is claimed to be suppressive principles of E, namely the
∧-axiom and the pre- and suffixing axioms. We have already looked at the
reasons given for thinking that the E-axiom and Reductio are suppressive.
What, then, are the reasons given for thinking that the three other mentioned
E-axioms involve suppression? I will now show that the reasons given are also
in this case rather wanting.
The ∧-axiom is said to yield to “similar counterexamples” as the E-
axiom ([27, p. 268]), although none are given. The story with the E-axiom is
that it suppresses the theorem A → A in the antecedent of the consequent of
((A → A) → B) → ((A → A) → B). Thus if the ∧-axiom is to be similar, it
ought to be the case that for some theorem C, A ∧ B → (C → (A ∧ B))
is a theorem, but that A ∧ B → (A ∧ B) fails to be a logical theorem
without it being forcibly added as a primitive axiom. This story, however, is
hard to substantiate as logics with the variable sharing property tend not to
have theorems on the form A ∧ B → (C → (A ∧ B)) since the weakening
24Conjunctive syllogism (Ax12) gives one (∼C → A) ∧ (A → C) → (∼C → C) from
which Reductio, some simple double negation fiddling, and the transitivity of → yields
(∼C → A) ∧ (A → C) → C. From this the contraposition axiom and some more double
negation fiddling suffices for (∼A → C)∧ (A → C) → C, from which the rules of BB suffices
for yielding (A ∨ ∼A → C) → C.
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Figure 6. The crystal lattice
axiom A → (C → A) can’t be a theorem of such logics. We can strengthen
this observation as follows:
Theorem 9. If A ∧ B → (C → (A ∧ B)) is a theorem of any sublogic of
R, then C shares propositional variables with both A and B. 
Proof. Assume that A ∧ B → (C → (A ∧ B)) is a theorem and for con-
tradiction that C does not share propositional variables with, say, B. Consider
the Crystal lattice displayed in Fig. 6. That model is a known model of R and
will therefore evaluate A ∧ B → (C → (A ∧ B)) to some value different
from 0. Assign every propositional variable in A to 2 and every variable in B
to 3. Since both {2} and {3} are subalgebra it follows that both A and A
will be evaluated to 2, that both B and B will be evaluated to 3, and that
both A ∧ B and (A ∧ B) will be evaluated to 1. Since C does not share
propositional variables with B we can also assign to every remaining proposi-
tional variable in C the value 2 so that C will be evaluated to 2 as well. We
now get a contradiction since 1 → (2 → 1) = 0. 
Thus if the ∧-axiom is suppressive, it only suppresses certain specific
theorems. Maybe there are such cases, but I haven’t been able to find any. I
therefore conclude that if indeed the ∧-axiom is a suppressive principle, it is
so in a sense not adequately specified by Routley et al.
Let’s move on to the transitivity axioms. (A → B) → ((C → A) →
(C → B)) and (A → B) → ((B → C) → (A → C)) are collectively called
ESyll, short for Exported Syllogism, by Routley et al., and are both deemed
to be suppressive. It is called exported in reference to the axiom they call
Exportation, namely (A ∧ B → C) → (A → (B → C)), their view being that
ESyll is an exported version of Conjunctive Syllogism (CSyll), (A → B)∧(B →
C) → (A → C). Now Exportation yields irrelevance since A ∧ B → B is a
logical axiom and so Exportation therefore yields A → (B → B), and since
they view irrelevance as an form of suppression, Exportation is regarded as a
suppressive principle. Routley et al. know of course that ESyll does not result
in irrelevance, but argue that the fact that it “is an exported form of CSyll
should, if anything, increase our suspicions of it.” [27, p. 269]. Their main
argument against ESyll, however, is as follows:
The contribution ESyll makes over and above CSyll would appear
to be that of allowing the suppression of certain true implications
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in certain positions. This is a very limited form of suppression and
it is not one which produces spectacular effects, like more wholesale
suppression, in the form of irrelevance. But if we are attempting
to explicate the concept of sufficiency, it must be rejected for just
the same reasons as the more obvious and general suppression prin-
ciples and resulting irrelevant forms. ESyll principles provide good
examples of those sorts of principles we alluded to earlier, namely
those that allow a certain degree of suppression but not so much
as to produce irrelevance. Remember that relevance is only a nec-
essary condition for an adequate system; so the fact that ESyll can
be added to certain systems without inducing irrelevance provides
on its own no justification for ESyll. [27, p. 271]
The thought here seems to be that the fact that A → B is true does
not suffice for allowing it to be dropped from the logically true claim (A →
B)∧ (B → C) → (A → C). This, however, according to Routley et al., is what
in effect is afforded by ESyll, which therefore is regarded as a suppressive
principle.
Now Routley et al. would object to suppression of merely true formulas
as well the suppression of theorems. Note, however, that in order for ESyll to
be suppressive in the way specified in the above quote, Routley et al. need to
use the concept of a rule in two different senses: for what is wrong with (A →
B) → ((C → A) → (C → B)), they say, is that it forces the consequent upon
us when the antecedent is merely true. However, the rule A → B  (C → A) →
(C → B) is a rule of most relevant logics—indeed all such logics considered in
this paper and therefore Routley’s two favorite logics DK and DL as well. They
do state that rules are to be interpreted as theorem preserving25, but if that
is the case, then the consequent of (A → B) → ((C → A) → (C → B)) need
not be forced upon us just because the antecedent is true. Furthermore, if one
looks at how rules are in fact used, the claim that rules are to be interpreted
as only theorem-preserving seems not to be adhered to by Routley et al. For
instance, the already mentioned triviality proof for näıve set theory in [27,
p. 367] happily uses the primitive rule A → (B → C)  A ◦ B → C, where ◦
is the intensional conjunction called fusion to get w ∈ w ◦ w ∈ w → p from
w ∈ w → (w ∈ w → p), where the latter formula is deduced from the formula
∃w∀x(x ∈ w ↔ (w ∈ w ◦ w ∈ w → p)). Thus they use rules as applying
to formulas deducible from assumptions which are not logical theorems, and
so use the rules as truth-preserving, not merely as theorem-preserving. But
then if ESyll detaches upon having a mere true antecedent, that is because
modus ponens is regarded as truth-preserving, not only as theorem-preserving.
25The following is a clear example of this:
For example, the rule of Modus Ponens, symbolised: A, A → B −− B, is read:
where A and A → B are theorems so is B. Generally the rules are not, in what
follows, intended to reflect entailment relations, or inferential connections such
as that expressed by ‘As ...; therefore... ’; they are simply schemes for generating
theorems from theorems. [27, p. 287]
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It is, of course, possible to restrict the pre- and suffixing rules, R3 & R4—
jointly refered to by Routley et al. as the affixing rules—of DK/DL to be
only theorem-preserving without also restricting the other two rules—modus
ponens and adjunction. That would then beget different logics than DK/DL as
defined both here as well as all other presentations of DK/DL by the authors
of [27]. Generally, however, it seems that it is more plausible to interpret rules
stated in the same syntactical way as the same type of rules: either all rules
are to be interpreted as theorem preserving, or all rules are to be interpreted
as truth preserving. But then if R3 & R4 are regarded as suppressive when
taken as truth-preserving rules, why think that beefing up the premise from
merely true to logically true would make for an unsuppressive rule? Why is
it permissible to suppress A → B in (A → B) ∧ (B → C) → (A → C) when
A → B is a theorem, but not when it is merely true?
The only sensible answer, it seems, would be to conclude that it is not only
ESyll which is suppressive—in a way not covered by any principle discussed by
Routley et al. I should note—but also that the affixing rules are suppressive.
Routley et al. did worry that these rules could be suppressive as well.26 In order
to shed light on this matter, Routley et al. [27, § 4.2] reaxiomatized the logic
B so as to include Substitutivity of Coimplicants, A ↔ B  D(A) → D(B), as
a primitive rule, where D(B) is obtained from D(A) by replacing one or more
instance of A by B. In addition they added the axioms (C → A ∧ B) → (C →
B) and (A ∨ B → C) → (A → C). These are easily verified to be deductively
equivalent axiomatizations. The possible suppressiveness of the affixing rules is
then formulated with CSyll as well as this reaxiomatization of B as a backdrop:
These reaxiomatisations of B and its extensions focus the issue as to
the correctness of the affixing rules on some special cases concerning
& and ∨. Thus if
(C → A & B) → (C → A)
is a correct principle for sufficiency or conditionality then Prefixing
is admissible. If, however, this principle really has A & B → A as a
further premiss and is obtained by suppression of this premiss from
the correct
(C → A & B) & (A & B → A) → (C → A),
then the principle is not a genuine sufficiency one and should be
rejected as an entailment principle. [27, p. 293]
26 Their basic logic is in fact the logic A being simply Routley’s logic DK minus the affixing
rules [27, pp. 221f]. This, then, sets them apart from the view of Lewis who, just like Routley
et al., included Conjunctive Syllogism as an axiom of his logics S2 and S3, but renounced S3
in favor of S2 when it turned out that S3 had the suffixing axiom as a theorem. His reaction
was also that “it gives the inference (q  r)  (p  r) whenever p  q is a premise. Except
Footnote 26b continued
as an elliptical statement for ‘(p  q) ∧ (q  r)  (p  r) and p  q is true,’ this inference
seems dubious.” [12, p. 496]. Despite this, Lewis seems to have been untroubled by Parry’s
proof that the suffixing rule holds for S2 (cf. [12, p. 507]).
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Thus Routley et al. regard it as an open issue whether not only ESyll,
but also the affixing rules are suppressive. They seem to model this on the
same idea as the rules (Ic)&(IIc) above. As with these rules, however, the
sober judgement here is surely that there simply is no available evidence which
points to either ESyll or the affixing rules being suppressive.
Routley et al. did not discuss the suppressiveness of the affixing princi-
ples further in volume one of Relevant Logics and their Rivals, and when, after
the untimely passing of Sylvan, the second volume, [7], eventually came out
21 years later, Brady, the editor of the second volume, wrote in the preface
that the focus on the issue of suppression would not be continued in that vol-
ume. The reason given, however, was that Brady thought that the suppression
exhibited by ESyll was benign and so focusing on suppression alone would
not suffice for reaching the so-called depth-relevant logics—DR and beneath
[7, p. 4]. Since no further account of suppression was ever given, the idea of
the suppressiveness of the affixing principles in particular, but also suppres-
sion in general, was left in a rather unsettled state. I conclude, rather, that
the suppressiveness of the affixing principles seems simply to be ill argued
for and badly motivated; there just seems to be no clear case made for the
suppressiveness of these principles.
I have in this section tried to make sense of some of Routley et al.’s use
of the notion of suppression which does not fit into the extensional notion
precisified by ASP and JFP. It was suggested that this could be viewed as a
slightly different intensional variant of suppression and the principles IASP
and IJFP were suggested for capturing it. It was shown, however, that neither
this notion, not even in combination with extensional suppression, sufficed for
ruling out the implicational paradoxes. Such paradoxes are not, according to
Routley et al., features of a good sufficiency relation, and thus it seems that
analyzing such a relation in terms of the principles ASP, JFP, IASP and IJFP
will not be satisfactory. Furthermore, we have seen that although intensional
suppression did rule out the E-axiom ((A → A) → B) → B, it also ruled out
Reductio which Routley et al. did not judge to be suppressive. It furthermore
did not rule the other principles differentiating DK and E as suppressive,
contra what was in fact claimed. The arguments for why such principles are
suppressive and therefore unacceptable for entailment taken as a sufficiency
relation were shown to be, to put it lightly, less than persuasive. I have, of
course, not demonstrated that there is no notion of suppression which will
do the job Routley et al. wanted suppression to do. However, the burden of
proof is now on the suppressivist to specify the rules of the game; if one is to
uphold the verdict that T, E and R are suppressive, then one needs to specify
what suppression here is and why such suppressive features can’t be features
of entailment taken as a sufficiency relation.
7. Summary
This essay has looked closer at Val Plumwood and Richard Sylvan’s, with
collaborators, notion of suppression. Plumwood and Sylvan developed it from
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that of an enthymeme, a notion which had already been used to argue for the
supremacy of the relevant logic E over classical, intuitionistic and modal logics
by Anderson and Belnap. Plumwood and Sylvan, however, argued that it was
freedom from suppression which was the fundamental feature of entailment.
Entailment, they claimed, is a sufficiency relation, and so does not admit any
form of premise suppression. Anderson and Belnap’s idea of analysing relevance
as variable sharing and premise use, they claimed, did not guarantee freedom
from suppression; although variable sharing was regarded as an important
property, it was viewed as no more than a mere negative test of adequacy and
eclipsed by the richer notion of suppression.
I have shown in this paper that the extensional so-called Anti-Suppression
Principle and the Joint Force Principle are both weaker than the Variable
Sharing Property, in fact properly weaker than even the Weak Variable Shar-
ing Property. As such, the principles do not suffice for ruling out the implica-
tional paradoxes, not even the ones of the first degree, contra what is claimed
in both [27] and [28]. A notion of intensional suppression was specified to give
content to the claim that the E-axiom ((A → A) → B) → B—an axiom even
named Suppression in [27]—is suppressive. It was shown, however, that nei-
ther this notion of suppression is strong enough, even when augmented with
the extensional notion of suppression, to rule out the implicational paradoxes.
We saw that the argument given for rejecting the archetypal intensional sup-
pressive principle, i.e. the E-axiom, was less than clear, and even though the
intensional notion of suppression did rule two of the axioms of E and R to be
suppressive, only one of these axioms, the E-axiom, was regarded as clearly
suppressive by Routley et al., whereas the other one, (A → ∼A) → ∼A, was in
fact taken as an axiom of one of Sylvan’s favorite logics, DL. We also saw that
the other principles which differentiate DL from the Anderson-Belnap logics
T and E were in fact neither extensionally nor intensionally suppressive. Thus
neither this notion of suppression could do the job intended for it, namely
to provide reasons for thinking that the Anderson-Belnap logics T, E, and
R cannot be viewed as capturing notions of entailment viewed as sufficiency
relations. Their arguments against the alleged suppressive principles of these
logics were shown to be rather wanting, and their proof that there are logics
which satisfies the variable sharing property, yet are obviously suppressive, was
shown to be rather obviously fallacious.
Their failure to make any serious effort at specifying what suppression is
in such a way as to make it clear that the logical principles charged of being sup-
pressive can indeed be recognized as such, as well as their failure to compare the
notion of suppression to the notions of relevance already available—specifically
to variable sharing, since they claim this to be a test and a derivative feature
of a good sufficiency relation—seems in hindsight rather peculiar. To think
of entailment as a sufficiency relation may yield some philosophical insight.
If this is to be analyzed as freedom from suppression, however, honest toil in
making the notion precise has to be made. Doubting that such toil will bear
any fruit, I bid suppression-freedom farewell!
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